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utin posters, postcards, New Year's greetings, 
t-shirts, wall clocks, calendars, oil portraits, 
biographies, encyclopedias, English-language 
primers, and films: in recent years, the figure 
of Russia's second president has loomed ever 
larger over the cultural landscape of the Russian 
Federation and the quantity and variety of Putin 
paraphernalia available for sale has correspondingly 
increased. Although I am not a serious collector of 
consumer items associated with the contemporary 
cult of personality, one object that I found in a kiosk 
just outside the metro station Akademicheskaya 
in Moscow in the fall of 2006 did capture my 
imagination: bright blue rubber balloons imprinted 
with the face of the Russian president. I bought a 
small supply for myself and also for Boris Isayevich 
Belenkin, the librarian at the central office of 
Memorial, who, I knew, had an interest in the 
iconography of power. In his work space, Belenkin 
had assembled an impressive display of artistic 
reproductions and photographs clipped from 
magazines, all of which contained human figures or 
animals with features that, to one extent or another, 
resembled Putin's: images of narrow-nosed dogs 
with long faces and sad, expressive eyes; a famous 
portrait by the fifteenth-century painter Jan van 
Eyck; Dobby, the house elf from the Harry Potter 
movies; a drowsy, slightly petulant-looking lemur. 
In this door-sized collage of images, it seemed, the 
leader's face emerged spontaneously and often 
incongruously from the pages of old magazines 
and from posters for long-forgotten exhibitions, 
as if nature and generations of artists from around 
the globe had, in dozens of separate acts of creation 
spread over a period of centuries, prophesied the 
emergence of Russia's current leader.
Belenkin, I thought, might like to add a Putin 
balloon to his collection of pseudo-Putiniana. 
What better object to crown the strange genealogy 
of images that he had constructed, than this 
joyous, supremely modern affirmation of political 
ascendancy!
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My gift was very well-received. Belenkin blew 
it up and then called in his friends as he set about 
affixing it to the wall. “Where,” Memorial staff 
members asked, “did you find that fabulous piece 
of filth? On the Arbat?” “What happens if we pop 
it? Would that count as a terrorist act?” Jokes about 
moral elasticity, puffed-up political leaders, and the 
possibility or desirability of their deflation followed 
in quick succession. “Who would make a thing like 
that?” someone asked. “Don't they think things 
through?”
No one at Memorial in Moscow, it seemed, had 
ever seen Putin balloons before or knew of their 
existence. At least initially, some staff members 
were inclined to view the balloon as a souvenir 
made primarily for tourists, something akin to 
the political matryoshki dolls and wooden eggs 
that have been ubiquitous to outdoor art markets 
since the late 1980s. They expressed surprise when 
I said that I had found it in a down-market kiosk 
that sold a mixture of cheap gifts and children's
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toys, computer supplies, batteries, and other odds 
and ends, presumably, to a predominately Russian 
customer base. One staff member promptly asked 
for exact directions, I assume so that she could go 
and buy a little “piece of filth” for herself and/or her 
loved ones.
In the context of the Memorial library, affixed 
to the top of Belenkin's Putin wall or attached to 
the lamp over his desk (it was displayed in several 
locations over the course of the next few weeks), the 
Putin balloon I bought read as an ironic comment 
on the current Russian president's growing cult 
of personality. It inspired sarcastic quips and 
gave Memorial staffers another excuse to vent 
the hostility that they felt towards the Russian 
president and their anxiety about anti-democratic 
trends in Russian society, particularly following 
the Politkovskaya assassination and the scandalous 
Litvinenko poisoning.
The balloons received a very different reaction 
when, after my return to the University of Oklahoma 
in December 2006, I showed them to a recent Russian 
immigrant who occasionally teaches introductory 
courses for us. Eyeing my “find” with complete 
indifference, she noted: “They carried those in 
demonstrations in Samara, where my mother lives, 
before the last election.” Quite clearly, unlike much 
of Memorial's staff, she did not perceive the balloons 
as a bizarrely ill-conceived manifestation of Putin's 
growing cult of personality; rather, she saw them 
as the normal detritus of the election process, the 
equivalent of a Barack Obama bumper sticker or a 
Hillary for President front-yard sign.
And, indeed, from a certain point of view, 
absolutely: she is right. What exactly is so 
outlandish about a balloon bearing the face of the 
Russian president? Balloons are a fairly standard 
accouterment of the political marketing process, 
which the Russians learned from extremely well- 
paid Western consultants in the early 1990s. They 
figure in essentially all U.S. elections. You could 
buy campaign balloons on the websites of a number 
of our 2008 presidential contenders, including both 
Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. True, in both 
cases, they were decorated with names and logos 
rather than the faces of the candidates, but is this 
difference in and of itself so essential? Doesn't it 
just reflect the fact that political consulting has a 
longer history in America than in Russia and hence 
has produced a somewhat greater store of collective 
wisdom? Advisors to our candidates have learned, 
by dint of hard experience, to anticipate the kind 
of ribbing that occurs in nighttime talk-show 
monologues (and the offices of NGOs) and hence,
as a rule, do not put their own candidate's face 
on anything that might easily explode. Are the 
Putin balloons I found really nothing more than 
an example of clumsily executed Russian election 
material?
The very different responses that I received 
from Russians to whom I showed the Putin 
balloons helped remind me of an important and, I 
think, very basic fact: a cult, like beauty, is to some 
extent always in the eye of the beholder. Whether 
or not we view a particular object as having cultic 
significance depends, to a large measure, on the 
context in which we see it. A Putin balloon pinned 
to Boris Belenkin's ironic display of pseudo- 
Putiniana means something very different than one 
carried in a political demonstration. Where we see 
an object for sale is important, because it seems to 
suggest something about its producer, sellers, and 
intended audience: Is it just a piece of kitsch slapped 
together for sale to foreign tourists who know little 
about contemporary Russia but may have seen, at 
one point or another, a photo of its judo-loving 
president? Did its maker mean the balloon to be 
carried in support of Putin and his policies? Who 
(other than me, obviously) buys Putin balloons at 
Metro Akademicheskaya and with what intention?
Many Putin objects, like these balloons, I think, 
have no fixed meaning in and of themselves. They 
are essentially empty or, if one prefers, so full 
of potentially conflicting significance that their 
meaning remains indeterminate. When individuals 
buy a postcard of Putin struggling to master a 
lump of clay at a pottery wheel, do they regard it 
with reverence or amusement? Does it show us an 
elected official being a good sport at some awful 
public event, or does it mockingly cast Putin as a 
leader of Soviet-style pretension, intent on “re 
shaping the nation and/or human nature”? How 
about the popular photographs of Putin out for 
a stroll with a jacket carelessly draped over one 
shoulder or the “romantic” fuzzy-edged Putin
posters that show the leader with a Byronic scarf
about his neck a la Pushkin? Offered for sale in 
bookstores around Russia, are they sold with an eye 
to their potential ironic appeal? If so, then how is 
it that these same images also appear in tediously 
reverent biographies and, for that matter, on office 
walls?
The question of how, where, and to whom
Putin paraphernalia is marketed is not, I think, 
irrelevant to a discussion of the larger issue of the 
origin of this contemporary cult of personality or, 
for that matter, of its function in Russian society. 
Scholars of earlier Soviet-era Russian and East
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European cults of personality have tended to 
understand these complex cultural structures as the 
result of the confluence of several distinct cultural 
trends: conscious top-down efforts to produce 
a new mythology of power and spontaneous 
expressions of reverence for Party leaders that are, 
even if self-interested, largely uncoached. Such a 
balanced attitude characterizes Nina Tumarkin's 
seminal study Lenin Lives! and also more recent 
work on communist cults such as Sarah Davies' 
article “Stalin and the Making of the Leader Cult 
in the 1920s,” and Benno Ennker's “The Stalin 
Cult, Bolshevik Rule and Kremlin Interaction,” 
all of which describe leader cults as emerging out 
of unprompted adulation and toadying as much 
as carefully orchestrated efforts to engineer new 
objects of worship, rituals, and belief systems.1
I believe that, at least in the case of the Putin 
cult, but potentially also other cults that reached 
their zenith in the years following Khrushchev's 
secret speech, another factor may also be in play: 
the satiric impulse. What came first, the Putin 
cult per se or the scandalous accusation that such 
a cult might be in the process of emerging? Were 
cultic practices really so indisputably evident 
when the first satiric sallies directed against Putin 
as great leader began to appear? Thinking back 
to the beginning of Putin's tenure in office, quite 
frankly, my own impressions are uncertain. I 
remember vividly, however, that the first time I 
saw a substantial group of Putin portraits for sale 
at a Russian bookstore, the display struck me as, on 
balance, more ironic than reverent. The photographs, 
posters, and postcards of the new president—he'd 
been in office for about a year—appeared alongside 
reprints of Stalin-era propaganda materials and 
frequently caught Putin in a pose that was, arguably, 
more than a little ridiculous. His neck constricted 
by starched shirt collars and overly-broad striped 
neck ties, he invariably looked undersized and 
uncomfortable. In most portraits, including those 
featuring contemplative poses, the expression 
on the new president's face seemed blank or 
apprehensive, rather than thoughtful, determined 
or triumphant. The placement of these Putin 
portraits next to reproductions of classic Stalinist 
propaganda begged the question: Regardless of his 
own ambitions, could the new president ever look 
anything but laughable in the role of secular deity?
1. Nina Tumarkin, Lenin Lives! (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1983), 231-32; The Leader Cult in 
Communist Dictatorship: Stalin and the Eastern Bloc, Balazs 
Apor, et al., eds. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 
29-30; 95-96.
Was his primary flaw an authoritarian character, his 
long association with the state security apparatus 
and seeming willingness to embrace the worst 
aspects of Soviet political culture, or, perhaps even 
more damningly, was it simply hubris?
For all that the Kremlin's media handlers and 
public relations consultants have carefully massaged 
Putin's public image over the past two terms, 
highlighting his athleticism, robust health, and 
decisiveness, the presidential cult of personality that 
suffuses so much of Russian culture today remains a 
contradictory phenomenon. A remarkable number 
of the most memorable cultural artifacts and texts 
associated with the Putin cult are at least arguably 
partly satiric in thrust. They are ambiguous: they 
are so grotesque in form and seem so self-conscious 
in their appropriation of the communicative norms 
of Soviet-era agitation that it is hard to take them 
completely seriously, and yet, at the same time, 
they have a surprising ability to attract audiences 
capable of giving them a straight reading. The 
pop anthem that the girl group Poiushchie vmeste 
(Singing Together) released in 2002 under the title 
“Ia khochu takogo, kak Putin” (I Want a Man Like 
Putin) represents a particularly striking example of 
this trend. The song boasts an infectious dance beat 
and lyrics penned by Aleksandr Elin, who is best 
known for his work with the heavy metal group 
Aria:
My boyfriend's in a jam again.
He got in a fight, he got wasted on hooch 
He's been such a pain, I kicked him out
And now I want a man like Putin.
A man like Putin, who's full of strength.
A man like Putin, who doesn't drink.
A man like Putin, who won't be mean 
A man like Putin, who won't flee the scene.
Should we really take this text as a 
straightforward attempt to glorify the president? 
As one reviewer noted in an online article entitled 
“Be Prepared to Do Battle for the Conceptualist 
Cause”: “I really can't take the group Poiushchie 
vmeste entirely seriously. That is simply beyond 
me. It seems more likely that this entire project is 
something like one of those lubki ‘General Putilin 
offs the hydra of oligarchy in the loo.' It looks 
entertaining and patriotic; the masses like it; so 




At times the relationship between the producers 
of Putin paraphernalia and texts, the consumers who 
take it upon themselves to ingest this material, and 
the commentators who write about it in the press 
assumes an almost Gogolian character. The 560- 
page Putin Encyclopedia (Putinskaia entsikplopediia), 
which appeared in Moscow in 2006, for instance, 
recounts the saga of the Cheliabinsk student 
Mikhail Anishchenko, who, in 2001 sued a German 
journalist for reprinting the text of a dreadful 
anthem of praise that he had written about the 
president as part of an ironic article. Offended that 
his “Song about the President” had been defiled, 
Anishchenko demanded the payment of moral 
compensation and the revocation of the journalist's 
credentials.3
Peppered with curious episodes like this, 
recounted in a manner that can only be described 
as arch, the Putin Encyclopedia is itself an interesting 
study in ambiguity. It opens with a page-and 
a-half-long preface entitled “Who This Book is 
About”(O kom eta kniga). The reference, it would 
seem, is obvious: as the subtitle on its cover proudly 
proclaims, the Putin Encyclopedia is a book about 
Putin, “his family, his team, his opponents, and 
possible successors.” In fact, however, Zenkovich's 
preface says almost nothing about Russia's second 
president. It focuses instead on Zenkovich's 
own formal choices as author and his efforts to 
accommodate the taste and needs of his potential 
readership. In the preface, Zenkovich explains 
that he chose to write an encyclopedic biography, 
because he felt that this genre best suited the “new 
generation of Russians [...] that started first grade in 
1985 when Gorbachev first came to power,” whose 
“members [.] think entirely differently than we did 
at their age.”4 In books, these new people, Zenkovich 
suggests, prefer “a wealth of data” as opposed to 
tidy historical narratives. They inhabit a world “of 
informational technology, artificial intelligence, and 
the re-examination of old ideological structures, of 
the confirmation of the eternal truism ‘Everything 
is born as heresy and dies as prejudice.'”5 If we read 
this last statement as a comment on the world view 
of Zenkovich's target audience, then it seems to 
allude to a particularly postmodern form of moral 
and intellectual relativism: the tendency to perceive 
ideas, beliefs, and values as transitory phenomena 
that pass through distinct life stages and then
3. Nikolai Zen'kovich, Putinskaia entsiklopediia: sem'ia, 
komanda, opponenty, preemniki (M; OLMA-PRESS Zvezd- 
nyi mir, 2006), 28-29.
4. Ibid., 3.
5. Ibid.
ultimately, after they have outlived their usefulness, 
pass into oblivion; the rejection (couched as an 
“eternal truism”) of the whole notion of everlasting 
truth.
The essentially Putin-less preface to Zenkovich's 
encyclopedia, I think, points to something 
enormously important in current Russian political 
and cultural reality: Isn't the real subject of the Putin 
cult, and hence of any book that focuses on it, the 
cult's diffuse army of creators and consumers? If 
this is so, then perhaps we should indeed consider 
the extent to which this phenomenon represents a 
product of distinctly postmodern modes of thinking 
and rhetorical practices, the tendency to employ 
both historical references and cultural citations as 
pure signs, divorced from their original context; a 
loss of faith in absolute truths and meta-narratives 
that imbues all communicative acts with a kind 
of inherent subjectivity; a inclination to find, in 
both the production and consumption of cultural 
content, opportunities for role play, mischief 
making, and free experimentation. For all that the 
Putin cult may seem superficially to resemble the 
cults of personality of the Soviet period, I wonder if 
it isn't, at least in certain respects, a fundamentally 
new animal, a product of distinctly contemporary 
social and communicative relations that speaks 
less of true unadulterated hero worship (although 
I do not question the statistics showing that most 
Russians were satisfied with their president's job 
performance) or even organized promotion than 
it does of rhetorical and perhaps philosophical 
indeterminacy.
What of Putin's place in the new leader cult? 
Up to now, I have accorded the figure of Russia's 
president almost as little attention in this essay as 
Zenkovich did in the preface to his encyclopedia. 
This has been intentional. Clearly, Putin's face and 
athletic physique exert a powerful hold on Russia's 
collective imagination today: how many other major 
European leaders appear, in photos circulated by 
their own public relations team, fishing topless or 
slamming opponents to the floor in judo matches? 
In a different sense, however, I think, Putin, as a 
physical entity, might reasonably be said to play a 
secondary role in the cultic structure that he inspired: 
in many recent works in which he theoretically 
figures, the president was accorded what amounts 
to a cameo. Putin works often focus on the strivings 
and travails of presidential observers or admirers; 
we glimpse the center of power only briefly and 
then from such a limited perspective that the 
president's nature, actions, and accomplishments 
remain largely unknowable. In Connie's Stories
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the infamous English-language children's primer 
that describes life from the perspective of the 
presidential dog, the identity of the black Labrador's 
eternally busy owner becomes clear only on the last 
page. In Victor Teterin's 2005 satiric play Putin.Doc, 
the president also remains, with the exception of 
a final scene, an off -stage presence, whose will is 
made manifest only in letters paraphrased by one 
of the two central characters, dueling little-men 
bureaucrats who compete to show who loves the 
great leader more.6
In this respect , I think, the Putin cult reads as an 
exaggeration of trends evident even in earlier Soviet- 
era personality cults. For all that they may seem to 
throw a spotlight on the center of power, political 
cults are always more about the act of worship 
than the godhead per se. They model appropriate 
behavior for devotees in minutely specific terms 
but characteristically sketch the deity's person and 
acts in broad, archetypal strokes. What is new in 
the contemporary cult is that the position of the 
worshipper is, as a legacy of conceptualist art and 
post-modern intellectual exploration, inherently 
problematized.
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